- We perceive that
safety and environmental impact issues (and what bodies like AEBC call
environmental liability issues) are issues dealt with by the regulatory
approval process of GM crops. All residual liability issues (including
what some parties incorrectly call environmental liability) relate to
economic and marketing issues only – see below and attached paper on
Co-existence in the UK.
- Four key words
summarise the co-existence and economic/marketing liability topic –
context, proportionality, consistency and equity. These are
examined in more detail below.
- Context.
GM trial crops, including the Farm Scale Evaluations (FSEs) have
co-existed with conventional and organic crops without economic and
commercial problems – no conventional or organic crops near to GM crops
have found any adventitious presence of GMOs. For the future, the
likelihood of economic and commercial problems of co-existence arising
remains very limited, even if there is a significant development of
commercial GM crops and increased plantings of organic crops because:
-
the GM traits being
commercialised in the next few years are in crops for which there is
limited demand for non GM material (with the possible exception of
sugar beet);
-
the organic areas of
the three key crops (oilseed rape, sugar beet and forage maize) are
extremely small (only 0.24% of the area planted to these crops in the
UK);
-
The organic area of
these crops (and other combinable crops) is likely to continue to be a
very small part of the total arable crop areas (even if there was a
tenfold increase in plantings), with a very limited economic
contribution relative to the rest of the UK arable crops. The
likelihood of these (organic) areas expanding is limited due to a
combination of adverse agronomic factors (eg, a need for sites with
few weed problems and the nutrient demanding nature of crops like
oilseed rape), limited demand, and market preference for competing
(imported) produce (eg, cane sugar);
-
The possibility of
gene transfer to related wild and other crop species from any of the
GM crops is extremely low-
this is also an issue examined before regulatory approval is given;
-
UK arable farmers
have been successfully growing specialist crops (eg, seed production,
high erucic acid oilseed rape) for many years, near to other crops of
the same species, without compromising the high purity levels
required;
-
some changes to
farming practices on some farms may be required once GM crops are
commercialised. This will however, only apply where GM crops are
located near non GM or organic crops for which the non GM status of
the crop is important (eg, where buyers do not wish to label
products as being GM or derived from GM according EU labelling
regulations). These changes are likely to focus on the use of
separation distances and buffer crops (of non GM crops) between the GM
crops and the ‘vulnerable’ non GM/organic crop and the application of
good husbandry (weed control) practices. GM crop planting farmers in
the FSEs already adopt these practices as part of applying the SCIMAC
guidelines for growing GM crops in the UK and would be provided with
‘GM crop stewardship programmes’ by seed suppliers, post
commercialisation.
Few GM planting farmers are however, likely to find themselves located
near to ‘vulnerable’ non GM/organic crops and hence the need to apply
all of these guidelines rigorously may not be necessary. For example,
if a farmer planted GM forage maize next to a non GM forage maize crop
and the non GM forage maize was fed to dairy cows whose milk produce
was sold into markets where the buyers were indifferent to the GM or
non GM status of the feeding regimes used.
- Consistency.
The organic sector currently applies
inconsistencies to GMOs and other ‘unwanted’ materials in organic
products. It should apply the same testing principles and thresholds
currently applied to GMOs to impurities (eg, introduce a de minimis
threshold on pesticide residues and apply a 0.1% threshold on the
limit for acceptance of all unwanted materials and impurities). It
should also accept that if it/they wish to retain policies towards GMOs
that advocate farming practices that go beyond those recommended for GMO
crop stewardship (eg, buffer crops and separation distances that are
more stringent than those considered to be reasonable to meet the EU
labelling and traceability regulations), then the onus for
implementation of such measures (and associated cost) should fall on the
organic certification bodies and their members in the same way as
current organic farmers incur costs associated with adhering to organic
principles and are rewarded through the receipt of organic price premia.
-
Proportionality (and equity). If highly
onerous GM crop stewardship conditions are applied to all farms
that might wish to grow GM crops, even though the vast majority of such
crops would not be located near to organic-equivalent crops or
conventional crops for which the non GM status is important, this would
be disproportionate and inequitable. In effect, conventional farmers,
who account for 99.76% of the current, relevant UK arable crop farming
area could be discouraged from adopting a new technology, that is likely
to deliver farm level benefits (yield gains, cost savings) and provide
wider environmental gains (reduced pesticide use, switches to more
environmentally benign herbicides, reduced levels of greenhouse gas
emissions).
- Equity.
It is important to recognise that if legislation was to be introduced
that placed a possible liability on GM using farmers for possible
economic/marketing impact on non GM farmers, then it can reasonably be
argued that, on equity grounds, the same principles should apply to non
GM (including organic) farmers, whose activities might have an adverse
impact on GM crop producers. For example, the hypothetical scenario of
a farmer growing a crop with a GM quality trait that loses its (quality
trait) price premia because of adventitious presence of non GM material
above an agreed threshold. Alternatively the possible example of an
organic potato farmer who suffers a blight attack (mainly because of the
much higher risks of infection in an organic system compared to a
conventional production system) and this spreads to adjacent
conventional farms, causing yield losses and/or the need to apply
additional sprays to curb the disease.
- Additional points:
-
In most markets for agricultural produce,
the burden of costs associated with maintaining the integrity of a
product or ‘preserving its identity’ falls on the sector that produces
that product and which is seeking to benefit from its production. For
example, producers of quality assured or regional produce, organic
produce, quality trait crops (eg, high erucic acid oilseed rape, high
oil maize, malting barley, bread-making quality wheat, basmati rice).
In all these cases, the respective products tend to trade at a premium
to the majority of produce traded and this premia provides the incentive
to initiate actions to preserve integrity and identity. This potential
allocation of the burden of costs is referred to in the Commission’s
Communication on co-existence of GM, conventional and organic crops
(2003);
-
There is currently no legally enforceable de
minimis threshold for the adventitious presence of GMOs in organic
products, below the ‘generally applicable’ 0.9% threshold introduced in
recent EU labelling legislation. EU organic regulations allow for the
setting of such a de minimis threshold but one has never been set or
proposed.
PG Economics
24 February 2004
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Co-existence of GM
and non GM crops: economic and market perspectives - PDF format
Co-existence
of GM and non GM crops: case study of maize grown in Spain - PDF format
Co-existence
of GM and non GM crops in the UK can occur without problems - PDF format
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